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 Toward Realistic Modeling Criteria of Games in 
Internet Security
By Jonathan M. Spring
There have been various attempts to apply game theory to various aspects of security situations. This paper is particularly interested in security as relates to computers and the Internet. While there have been varying levels of success in 
describing different aspects of security in game-theoretic terms, there has been little 
success in describing the problem on a large scale that would be appropriate for making 
decisions about enterprise or Internet security policy decisions. This report attempts to 
provide such a description.
We propose that there are three types of players in the game: 
the computer user, the malicious actor, and the security 
architect. This paper is not about how to “win” the game 
of Internet security or a prescription of the clever strategy 
— as game theorists make clear, “the search for effective 
decisions is not a central problem of game theory” [29]. The 
aim of this paper is two-fold, one for theorists and one for 
practitioners. For game theorists, this paper provides a more 
accurate description of the actual dynamics of security-related 
interactions on the Internet. For practitioners, we will provide 
a framework to clarify existing motivations and intuitions 
about the current situation and why it is, or is not, working. 
Hopefully this perspective on the dynamics of the situation 
will enable more effective decisions and guide the search for 
clever solutions using other fields of study.
This paper does not focus on building mathematical tools for 
analysis. We focus on the description of the game. The three 
players — user, rogue, and architect — all have competing 
interests. The main interactions are thus: (1) The user and 
architect negotiate a suitable system configuration which 
includes trade-offs between productivity (of the user), security 
(architect’s goal), and cost; this is a non-zero sum game. 
This occurs on a much slower time scale than the other two 
interactions. (2) The rogues attempt to steal resources from 
the user; this feature is also not a zero-sum game, and so 
presents some interesting challenges. (3) The third interaction 
is between the architects and the rogues. Although these two 
parties are defined as diametrically opposed, their interaction 
is also not zero-sum.
With these interactions laid out, we make the following 
important observation about the game itself: the user 
can ignore, or even be complicit with, the rogue without 
immediate loss. This fact makes it harder to convince the 
user to work with the architect to improve security. There are 
other interesting points to consider related to the game: (1) 
The game is modeled with three players, and we assert that at 
least this many players is necessary to maintain fidelity with 
the real Internet; (2) perfect security cannot be promised, even 
in principle, because the features of the game are such that 
there is no guaranteed method to compute a globally-optimal 
strategy (three player game, the fact that it is non-zero-sum, 
and the fact that there is imperfect information).
1 Introduction
Game theory was founded as a sub-discipline of mathematics 
in the mid-20th century. It is a description of how rational 
decision makers compete. However, this paper is not about 
how to “win” the game of Internet security or a prescription of 
the clever strategy — as game theorists make clear, “the search 
for effective decisions is not a central problem of game theory” 
[29]. What game theory can illuminate is how an interaction 
proceeds, certain rules about the outcome given the inputs, 
and to help an analyst clarify a situation by reducing a complex 
situation to a more compact description.
For the purposes of this paper, we will assume the payoffs 
to the players are already defined. How to do this is non-
obvious. However, a process such as the model described in 
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[35] provides a plausible method for arriving at the payoffs, 
measured in monetary resources lost or gained.
Game theory assumes we have rational decision makers. 
Kahneman’s psychological work, and the resulting behavioral 
economics literature, demonstrate that people are not purely 
rational. This has important ramifications for actually selecting 
policies that will be effective, however from our abstract point 
of view it just means we might have to adjust our payoff values 
to account for the fact that people may value something more 
or less than is rational. As such, we will leave this issue aside 
for now.
When describing the game, we will describe the payoff 
matrices to the extent possible — which values are positive 
or negative, their relative magnitudes, etc. However, our goal 
is not to formulate games to the level of detail that analytic 
or numeric solutions are possible. There is still much work to 
be done before that can be achieved. The goal of this paper 
is to provide the shape of a game as it relates to information 
security on the Internet.
2 Related work
Game theory was kicked off in 1944 as a robust field by [37] 
and saw application to such national security issues as nuclear 
deterrence and mutually assured destruction. The essential 
problems of bargaining and non-cooperative games were laid 
out by John Nash in the early 1950s [27, 26]. Founded as a 
branch of mathematics, after the theory acquired conceptual 
foundations (see [30, 29] for a summary), notions from game 
theory spread to a number of fields, notably economics (for 
example [31]). Some game theorists have also taken influence 
from other fields, such as evolution and dynamical systems 
[15]. Some game theory texts are broad, mathematical 
treatments such as [28]. Useful for the work described in this 
paper are treatments of non-cooperative games and games of 
incomplete information, which is included in some of the 
above but focused in some texts such as [14, 25].
There have been previous efforts to extend game theory 
into the field of information security; [34] summarize 
and categorize the efforts. Game-theoretic models have 
been proposed for both organization-scale [7] and single-
wireless-node-scale [40] information security games; both 
as single-play [36] and repeated games [20]. As economics 
intersects game theory it also intersects information security; 
for a summary of the extensive work on the economics of 
information security, see [5].
We heuristically derive our model from case studies and 
empirical reporting of information-security relevant behavior 
on the Internet. There are several organizations that report on 
various aspects of cyber-crime and human behavior, in varying 
levels of detail, such as [4, 33, 2, 23, 13, 19, 24, 9, 8, 1]. These 
sources do not generally attempt to derive a general model 
from the information observed. There is some work in cyber-
crime and risk dynamics such as [23, 35] that model criminal 
behavior, which inform our game theoretic modeling directly.
It seems that all existing applications of game theory to 
information security force the game to be a two-player game. 
Some study population dynamics of users and adversaries [39], 
which has richer descriptive power, but these retain still only 
two types of players. These efforts do not seem satisfactory 
in describing the Internet-scale phenomenon of information 
security, as reported by the economics, cyber-crime and 
dynamics literatures. We assert that a primary reason for this 
shortcoming is that the game cannot be described with fewer 
than three players.
3 Theory
The following subsections describe a more adequate treatment 
of the modern Internet security landscape. First, we describe 
the players; secondly, how they interact informally; finally, a 
more formal definition of the interaction.
3.1 The players
We shall define three classes of players. Granted, these classes 
may be subdivided for certain purposes, but we shall treat them 
as the essential units for our purpose of providing an accurate 
and useful model of the security interactions on the Internet. A 
single person or machine may change roles during its lifetime, 
and the ability to do so presents practical challenges, however 
we shall treat the three classes of players as describing mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive roles. The first step is to describe these 
players, their goals, and their capabilities.
User is an agent who utilizes a computer system. By definition, 
they have not designed the system they are using. 1 The user 
may have access to a limited number of configuration options 
provided by the architect of the system. The main goal of the 
user is to produce some product of value, using the computer 
1 An agent may both use one system and be the architect of another; most soft-
ware developers fit this description. However the roles of user and architect qua 
roles do not overlap.
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system as a tool to that end. Possible products span the range 
of human ingenuity. An important consequence is that the 
Internet as we are analyzing it is not a closed system, it is a tool 
of the larger human economy. This is a factor in the assessment 
that games involving users are not zero-sum.
Architect is the agent that has designed a computer system 
or the policy under which the system operates. This may 
be operating system developers, enterprise security policy 
designers, or the IETF; there is a wide range of systems and 
they all have architects. Architects can also be identified with 
the owner and administrative operator of a system, especially 
in the case of enterprise organizations. The architect is who 
selects and enforces security policies.
Architects, as a group, are the hardest to unify as one label. 
Members of this group are highly specialized and fractal. Since 
no organization builds all of its own software, every architect is 
also the user of other systems. However, the essential element 
is not what role a particular person has. The key fact is that 
every system has an architect or architects that have designed 
it. The Internet is not a natural phenomenon, and so while it 
is bound by some physical laws the key feature is that every 
system that operates on the Internet has an architect who 
made decisions about that system, its capabilities, and so on. 
In the general case, the architect’s goal is for their system to be 
used by users. A part of this goal is making it secure enough 
to be used, however it would be naive to say that an architect’s 
primary goal was a secure system. If this were the only goal, 
the systems could all be turned off and encased in concrete to 
accomplish the goal. To specify what it means “to be usable” 
the architect specifies aims in reference to what users need to 
accomplish user’s goals.
Rogue is the attacker. The definition of an attack can be 
disputed, but we shall mean attack as defined by Howard 
and Longstaff: “a series of steps taken by an attacker to 
achieve an unauthorized result; ... among these steps is an 
action directed at a target (an event), as well as the use of 
some tool to exploit a vulnerability. Second, an attack is 
intended to achieve an unauthorized result as viewed from 
the perspective of the owner or administrator of the system 
involved” [33]. Considering a system as large as the Internet, 
and given global political disagreements, it would be naive to 
think that we could agree on one rogue or set of rogues. An 
entity that is a user according to one point of view may be 
a rogue according to another point of view, and we may not 
be able to say that either point of view is correct. However, 
each user will experience a rogue that perpetrates attacks. The 
scope or goal of these attacks may vary; money, fame, chaos, 
or national interest may all be motivators for different rogues 
in varying degrees.
We assert not only that these are three players in a game 
describing Internet security, but that these are the only three 
types of players. Further, that all three must be modeled if a 
description of Internet security is to be accurate. For discussion 
of modeling more than three players at once, see Subsection 
3.2.4.
3.1.1 Realizations
There will be multiple realizations of this game occurring in 
the world simultaneously. There are more than three agents on 
the Internet at any given time, so the above is a simplification. 
From different points of view different agents will be 
considered to be in different rolls, whether user, architect, or 
rogue. The fact that agents can change roles certainly can have 
real-world impacts. For example, the NSA’s involvement in 
the design and architectural review of DES can be seen from 
many points of view [18]. The historical claim was that NSA 
may have negotiated down the key size because it wanted to 
be able to attack the protocol more easily in its role as rogue. 
However, it was permitted at the negotiating table in the 
first place because it was going to be a legitimate user of the 
protocol as well.
That one organization may have competing goals does not 
break the user-architect-rogue model. Various realizations of 
the model in the real world will alter the agents playing the 
game, their rolls, and their payoffs. However, the changes 
do not affect the general description of the game. This is 
one benefit of describing the game at the proposed level 
of abstraction. Although agents can serve multiple roles 
simultaneously in the real world, to simplify modeling at this 
early stage we put that aside and focus on the goals of the 
agents in each of the three rolls and the essential features of 
the interactions between a user, architect, and rogue.
3.2 Features of the Game
It is not possible to separate the three players from each other. 
The observation that there are three distinct, essential roles in 
the game is a vital observation. The other attempts (see Section 
2) at bringing game theory into security have focused solely 
on two-player games. We believe this to be a primary factor 
in why these attempts have had unsatisfactory applicability 
to actual security decisions.
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be done without loss of generality or specificity. In practice 
that approach seems unrealistic — the user and architect 
do not check in every few seconds to confirm “change 
nothing” — but it may be a feasible model.
However it is modeled, the players are assumed to be bound 
by the terms negotiated for some number of repetitions of 
the faster games. Another possible option for modeling the 
problem could be borrowed from multiscale mathematics 
[38]. Unfortunately, we are unaware of any applications of 
multiscale mathematics to game theory at this time.
3.2.2 user-rogue
Conceptually, the interaction between the user and the rogue 
is one in which the rogue is attempting to steal the user’s 
resources. Since this is theft, it would appear on the face of 
it to be a zero-sum game. However, we do not believe this 
to be the case. The rogues are not necessarily stealing purely 
rivalrous goods. If the resources stolen are non-rivalrous, then 
the user is not inconvenienced by the rogue’s usage, and so 
the game is non-zero-sum. Money is rivalrous, but money is 
not the only resource the rogues steal. Rogues can also steal 
computer resources or information.
For an example of rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods, 
consider a sweater. If it is cold out, I like to wear a sweater. 
If you steal my sweater, I cannot wear it and I will be cold. 
Sweaters are a rivalrous good. Stealing my sweater would be 
a zero-sum game, because one’s loss is precisely the other’s 
gain. Now consider Pythagoras’s theorem concerning the 
lengths of sides of a triangle. If a teacher knows it, and 
teaches the students that a2 + b2 = c2 the teacher is not 
excluded from using that information. It is not as if the 
teacher gave out 20 sweaters. The usage of the theorem 
does not prevent others from also using it. Theorems, and 
information items generally, are non-rivalrous.
Internet access and computer processing cycles are not 
precisely the same as information in this regard, but they are 
more alike to non-rivalrous goods than they are like sweaters. If 
a user is only consuming 10% of available Internet bandwidth 
because, perhaps, they are asleep or out of the house most 
of the time, then a rogue with control of the computer can 
use the rest of the bandwidth without inconveniencing the 
user. Likewise with processor cycles and disk storage space. 
Precisely how the rogue must act in order to achieve this goal 
may require some technical cleverness, however here we are 
interested in specifying the nature of the game, not clever 
ways to attack or protect systems.
Information (and computer resources) can be given a 
monetary value. Information is often given monetary value 
in intellectual property rules and debates, for example. Yet the 
same information may easily have different value to different 
parties. Thus while we may reasonably expect to value the 
resources in the game we are describing, the game will be 
non-zero sum not just because the goods in question are 
non-rivalrous but also because the different players value the 
resources differently. For example, even if Eve gains something 
that Alice loses, if Eve considers it to be worth 1 unit, yet 
Alice valued having it at 2 units, the transfer is non-zero sum.
The payoffs for this repeated game accrue on a relatively 
short time scale compared to the user-architect interaction, 
as noted above. Also similar to as noted above, the rogues 
likely have different discounting rates than either the users 
or the architects for the repeated aspect of the game. Given 
the illicit nature of the rogues’ activity, it is plausible that the 
rogues are the least patient.
Prior actions will have an effect on future payoffs in this 
interaction. As the rogue compromises more user resources, 
the rogues can use those resources to compromise further user 
machines. These invested resources also play in to the architect-
rogue interaction because rogues can use these compromised 
resources to evade the architects. Therefore, actions taken in 
this plane of the game directly affect others, just as in the 
user-architect interaction.
3.2.3 architect-rogue
This plane of the game describes the interaction between 
those who design and own the systems and those who are 
attempting to subvert those systems. It is the more difficult 
plane to characterize intuitively. Since all of this occurs on 
computer technology, the rogue can directly attack the systems 
the architect is using to protect the users. However, in order 
to maintain clarity, the rogue is not attacking the architect 
directly; they are attempting to subvert the protections that the 
architect has in place to protect the user. This includes aspects 
such as email filtering, anti-virus signatures or other host-based 
protection systems, firewall rules, intrusion detection system 
(IDS) signatures, etc. The architect can generally reconfigure 
these rules at machine speed, and the rogue can likewise 
employ countermeasures quickly, and so this interaction’s 
timescale is approximately the same order of magnitude as 
the user-rogue interaction.
This game is clearly non-cooperative and is not a game of 
perfect information. Both parties are intentionally obscuring 
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(6) ∀α(∃ω:∥ωα∥ > 1)
(7) ωα
t = ωβ
t ⇔ α = β
Exactly which elements are in ωα
t for each player α may be 
a matter of negotiation, as noted in Section 3.2. The extent 
the architect is permitted to monitor the user, for example, is 
in practice a function of the user’s privacy concerns. Limiting 
information sets provides a formal way to discuss such concerns, 
as privacy partly means not being able to distinguish one user’s 
data from another’s.
4 Discussion
The game as proposed indicates some useful ways to think about 
the true nature of the real-world situation. The fact that the 
interaction between the rogue and the user is non-zero-sum is 
critical. This fact is due to the nature of digital resources — they 
are not truly rivalrous. Thus, there may be a strategy in which the 
rogue benefits and the user has negligible losses. In this case, the 
architect could not expect to impose constraints on the user to 
prevent the rogue’s gains. The user’s payoff may well be higher 
by not accepting such constraints. This situation helps explain 
the general difficulty the security community experiences with 
getting users to heed their warnings [3], for example.
The assertion that the game of network and Internet security 
as (at least) a three-person game is noteworthy. The game as 
described cannot be reduced to two players by putting two of the 
three players in a coalition. The facts of the Internet ecosystem 
prevent genuine coalitions in practice, and many interests of 
the parties do not align even in principle. Since the game has 
three players, a straightforward calculation of a globally-optimal 
strategy is not possible.
The game description also provides some practical guidance for 
policy and decision making. For example, if the payoff matrix is 
affected by the size of the rogue’s infrastructure, and negotiations 
with the user community is stalled, then the architect’s efforts 
would be best targeting at removing key elements of the criminal 
infrastructure. It also may be able to highlight certain areas that 
can only be solved politically as Internet governance issues, and 
so on.
The fact that each player has imperfect information, and that 
each player has different information about the game, is also a 
key point. Internet security is not chess, in which each player 
knows all the moves the other player makes — chess is a game 
of perfect information [30]. In chess, if one could enumerate the 
strategy space then one can select the globally-optimal strategy. 
Internet security should not be modeled as such a game, as the 
Internet does not function as a system with perfect information. 
Operational security cannot, in principle, hope to find a globally-
optimal strategy.
5 Future Work
High level simulations of the posited formalisms would help 
to guide the plausibility of the formalisms. Establishing some 
hypothetical payoff matrices and attempting to calculate a 
solution or preferred strategy would also be an important next 
step. In general, all the formalizations can be made more detailed. 
More detail would then allow for a more rigorous analytic 
treatment, which would probably reveal more subtle strategic 
elements of the game.
The existence of any equilibria needs to be determined in order 
to guide other inquiries into intelligent strategies. Nash equilibria 
usually exist [31], for example, and a more detailed analysis could 
prove their existence for this game.
There is also a gap between this abstract analysis and practical 
measurement of the current state of affairs on the Internet that 
would need to be bridged before the model could be applied 
directly to the Internet. The present model is not sufficiently 
detailed to begin such measurement. Further, there is not 
a good framework for measuring crime on the Internet, as 
discussed in [5], although the authors therein propose some 
improvements. Eventually, such measurement efforts would need 
to be compatible with abstract modeling efforts so that the two 
can inform each other.
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internationales Strafrecht, 2008.
[21] Tyler Moore, Richard Clayton: “Evil searching: Compromise and 
recompromise of internet hosts for phishing”, Financial Cryptography 
and Data Security, pp. 256—272, 2009.
[22] Roger B Myerson: Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University 
Press, 1997.
Cyber Security and Information Systems Information Analysis Center (CSIAC) 11

